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Reconciling the Consumer “Right to Know” with 
the Corporate Right to First Amendment 
Protection 
INTRODUCTION 
Requiring a company to publicly condemn itself is undoubtedly a more effective 
way for the government to stigmatize and shape behavior than for the government 
to convey its view itself, but that makes the requirement more constitutionally 
offensive, not less so.1 This Comment will confirm the constitutional validity of this 
statement as it applies to government-mandated disclosures in the context of 
commercial speech.  
The First Amendment guarantees both “the right to speak freely and the right to 
refrain from speaking at all.”2 In 1976, the United States Supreme Court 
unequivocally extended these protections to “commercial speech,”3 which is broadly 
defined as “speech [that] does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction.’”4 
Challenges to governmental regulations, both attempting to suppress and to compel 
commercial speech, have produced two levels of First Amendment scrutiny: Central 
Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny and Zauderer’s rational-basis review.5 Central 
Hudson was designed to address governmental regulation of commercial speech 
that is not false or deceptive, and does not deal with unlawful activities.6 Zauderer, 
at its inception, was designed to apply to the government’s regulatory efforts to cure 
 
© 2017 Jeffrey S. Wettengel  
    J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, 2017; B.A., University of 
Maryland, College Park, 2013. All opinions, errors, omissions, and conclusions in this Comment are my own. 
 1.  Reply Brief of Appellants, at 27–28, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015), 2013 
WL 6019681, at *13.  
 2.  See American Meat Ruling May Whet Supreme Court Appetite, WILEY REIN, LLP (May 15, 2014) 
http://www.wileyrein.com/newsroom-articles-3158.html (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)).  
 3.  See infra text accompanying note 32; infra Section II.  
 4.  Bolger v. Young Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (quoting Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Couns., Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).  
 5.  Infra Section II.  
 6.  Infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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consumer deception in the context of commercial speech.7 While the application of 
Central Hudson has maintained a relatively steady course, lower courts have proven 
unable to uniformly interpret and apply Zauderer.8 Specifically, these courts have 
improperly applied Zauderer’s rational-basis review to information-forcing 
disclosure mandates promulgated by the government that are not intended to cure 
perceived threats of consumer deception.9  
Federal regulatory agencies, as well as state legislatures, have latched on to this 
expansion of Zauderer in attempting to require corporate disclosures of product 
information that corporations otherwise elected to omit.10  Many of these 
regulations stem from what has come to be known as the consumer “right to 
know.”11 The basic premise underlying this movement is that consumers have a 
right to know about product processes and characteristics, and that, absent such 
regulations, corporations would not otherwise disclose such information.12 The 
application of Zauderer, rather than Central Hudson, is ideal for the government 
because Zauderer’s rational-basis review presents a significantly lower threshold for 
the government to meet than Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny.13 While the 
public could theoretically benefit from the government having a lower 
constitutional bar in promulgating regulations, Zauderer’s rational-basis scrutiny 
applies only to regulations intended to cure consumer deception.14 Because 
regulations prompted by the consumer right to know entail disclosure mandates 
aimed at satisfying consumer curiosity, Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny 
necessarily governs.15 Accordingly, the application of Zauderer’s rational-basis 
review in these circumstances unconstitutionally infringes on the heightened 
protections that are afforded to private corporations under the First Amendment 
when consumer deception is not at issue.16  
Section I of this Comment outlines the evolution of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence in the realm of commercial speech under the First Amendment. 
Section II then discusses the emergence of Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny 
and Zauderer’s rational-basis review, as well as the way in which these two standards 
were designed to apply. It also highlights the inconsistent and extremely convoluted 
way in which lower federal courts have applied Zauderer. In Section III, this 
 
 7.  Infra note 24 and accompanying text.  
 8.  See infra Section II.C. 
 9.  See infra Section II.C. 
 10.  Infra Sections IV.A, IV.B. 
 11.  See infra Section IV.  
 12.  See infra text accompanying notes 109–10. 
 13.  Compare infra Section II.A, with infra Section II.B. 
 14.  See infra Section III.A.  
 15.  See infra Sections II.A, II.B. 
 16.  See infra Section V.  
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Comment offers guidance as to the proper circumstances in which to apply 
Zauderer and the way that courts should apply Zauderer’s legal test. Section VI 
defines the consumer right to know and highlights two notable pieces of legislation 
that were directly, or incidentally, intended to appease such consumer curiosity. 
Thereafter, Section V reinforces the reasons that Central Hudson, rather than 
Zauderer, should govern information-forcing regulations intended merely to better 
educate consumers in their purchasing decisions. This section demonstrates that 
much of the pre-existing regulatory structure will remain unchanged because the 
majority of those regulations do, in fact, satisfy Central Hudson. Section VI 
discusses the impact that the degradation of Zauderer may have on corporate 
disclosures mandated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.  
The increasing pervasiveness of the consumer right to know movement 
highlights the need for the Supreme Court to reign in the lower courts’ improper 
expansion of Zauderer. By cabining Zauderer to consumer deception and declaring 
that Central Hudson governs regulations intended to appease consumer curiosity, 
the Supreme Court will ensure that private corporations receive adequate 
protection under the First Amendment.  
I.  BACKGROUND OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT  
Private corporations find protection under the First Amendment just as individual 
citizens do.17 However, commercial speech, or commercial silence, is often the 
subject of criticism from state and federal governments.18 The two most 
fundamental challenges to governmental action under contemporary First 
Amendment commercial speech jurisprudence are Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York19 and Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court.20 Central Hudson revolved around the issue 
of private electric utilities using advertisement to promote increased use of 
electricity,21 and Zauderer was centered on concerns of attorney advertisements.22 
From these cases emerged two different levels of scrutiny, intended to be applied in 
different circumstances: Central Hudson’s “intermediate scrutiny” was designed to 
address governmental regulation of commercial speech that was not false or 
 
 17.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (citing 
Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Couns., Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761–62 (1976)).  
 18.  See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 
F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled by Am. 
Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).  
 19.  447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 20.  471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 21.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 558–60.  
 22.  Zauderer, 461 U.S. at 629.  
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deceptive, and does not deal with unlawful activities23; Zauderer is a more relaxed 
level of scrutiny which, at its inception, was designed to apply to governmental 
regulation of commercial speech involving consumer deception.24  
Commercial speech has not always found refuge under the First Amendment. In 
1942, there was general agreement among federal courts that the Constitution did 
not impose a restraint on the government with respect to commercial advertising.25 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, however, began to shift in the years following the 
1942 declaration that the Constitution provided unfettered control over 
commercial advertising by the government. The Supreme Court recognized that 
speech in political ads,26 classified ads,27 and ads for abortion services28 was protected 
under the First Amendment.29 While these cases marked a significant departure 
from the holding in Valentine v. Christensen in 1942,30 the rulings were narrowly 
confined to regulating advertising and had yet to fully address commercial speech as 
a whole.31  
In 1976, the Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc. held that the First Amendment, as applied to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects commercial speech from 
unwarranted government regulation.32 Virginia Pharmacy was the seminal case in 
recognizing that commercial speech was entitled to full First Amendment 
protection under what is now widely referred to as the “Commercial Speech 
 
 23.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (interpreting Central 
Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny test). 
 24.  Id. at 651. 
 25.  Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes 
no such restraint on government as respects commercial advertising.”), overruled by Virginia St. Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 26.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964) (considering an Alabama court’s award of 
damages pursuant to a libel suit related to an editorial advertisement). 
 27.  See generally Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 391 
(1973) (rejecting claims that a local ordinance limiting advertisements in a wanted advertisement violated the 
press companies constitutional speech rights).  
 28.  See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (holding that a state statute prohibiting the sale or 
circulation of any publication promoting an abortion infringed on constitutional protections of free speech). 
The Court clarified its ruling in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, emphasizing the 
speech was not protected only because it was illegal and otherwise would have received some level of protection 
under the First Amendment. Id. at 821.  
 29.  Tamara R. Piety, The First Amendment and the Corporate Civil Rights Movements, 11 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 
1, 4 (2016). 
 30.  316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that the Constitution does not impose restrictions on governmental 
regulation of commercial speech). 
 31.  See supra text accompanying notes 26–28. 
 32.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (citing 
Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761–62 (1976)). 
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Doctrine.”33 Protections for commercial speech became further entrenched in the 
First Amendment in Central Hudson when the Supreme Court noted that “[i]n 
applying the First Amendment to [commercial speech], we have rejected the ‘highly 
paternalistic’ view that government has complete power to suppress or regulate 
commercial speech.”34 While commercial speech does enjoy First Amendment 
protection, the Court in Zauderer tempered that protection by holding that a state 
may, without violating the First Amendment, correct the problem of commercial 
speech that is deceptive or misleading.35 
II.  FOUNDATIONS OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH STANDARDS 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s unqualified declaration in Virginia Pharmacy that the 
First Amendment protected commercial speech from unwarranted governmental 
regulation,36 courts were unclear as to the scope of the term “commercial speech” 
and whether such speech enjoyed constitutional protection.37 In 1983, the Court 
again emphasized that there was no longer any room to doubt that what had come 
to be known as “commercial speech” was entitled to protection by the First 
Amendment. 38  By 1985, the Court had promulgated two standards by which to 
evaluate the constitutionality of governmental regulation of commercial speech.39 
Section II.A of this Comment will discuss Central Hudson’s intermediate 
scrutiny, a standard that applies to governmental regulation of commercial speech 
that does not concern consumer deception.40 Section II.B of this Comment will 
discuss the Zauderer Standard, a standard that, at its inception, was designed to 
evaluate the constitutionality of governmental redress of deceptive commercial 
speech.41  
A.  Central Hudson’s Intermediate Scrutiny  
The Supreme Court first formalized a test under the commercial speech doctrine in 
its 1980 decision in Central Hudson.42 In this case, the Court was presented with the 
 
 33.   John M. DiPippa, The Demise Of The Commercial Speech Doctrine And The Regulation Of Professional’s 
Advertising: The Virginia Pharmacy Case, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 245, 245 (1977) (“The Supreme Court in 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. finally put the doctrine to rest by 
holding that commercial speech, like other forms of expression, is entitled to full first amendment protection.”). 
 34.  447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980). 
 35.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985).   
 36.  See supra text accompanying note 32.  
 37.  See Population Servs. Int’l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).  
 38.  Bolger v. Young Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
 39.  See infra Sections II.A, II.B. 
 40.  See infra Section II.A. 
 41.  See infra Section II.B.  
 42.  See generally Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
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issue of whether New York State’s Public Service Commission order that electric 
utilities in the state cease all advertising promoting the use of electricity was 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.43 In December of 1973, the 
Commission ordered electric utilities in New York State to cease all advertising that 
“promot[es] the use of electricity.”44 The order was based on the Commission’s 
finding that “the interconnected utility system in New York State [did] not have 
sufficient fuel stocks or sources of supply to continue furnishing all customer 
demands for the 1973–1974 winter.”45 The Commission also thought that 
promotional advertising would give “misleading signals” to the public by appearing 
to encourage energy consumption at a time when conservation was needed.46 
From this case, the Court developed a four-part analysis that would dictate when 
the government could regulate commercial speech:  
At the outset, we must determine whether expression is protected by the 
First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it 
at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask 
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries 
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly 
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more 
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.47 
In subsequently discussing the applicability of Central Hudson’s intermediate 
scrutiny, the Supreme Court explained that the test applies to governmental 
regulation of commercial speech that is not false or deceptive, and that does not 
concern unlawful activities.48 
B.  Zauderer’s Rational-Basis Review  
While the precise bounds of the category of expression that may be termed 
“commercial speech” are subject to question, it is clear that advertising falls within 
those constraints.49 In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court,50 
the Supreme Court was faced with two unresolved questions regarding the 
regulation of commercial speech made by attorneys: (1) whether a State may 
 
 43.  Id. at 558. 
 44.  Id.  
 45.  Id. at 559. 
 46.  Id. at 560. 
 47.  Id. at 566. 
 48.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985) (interpreting 
Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny test). 
 49.  Id. at 637. 
 50.  471 U.S. 626 (1985).  
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discipline an attorney for soliciting business by running newspaper advertisements 
containing non-deceptive illustrations and legal advice; and (2) whether a State may 
seek to prevent potential deception of the public by requiring attorneys to disclose 
certain information regarding fee arrangements in their advertising.51 
In resolving these issues, the Court channeled the teachings of three precedential 
cases involving advertising.52 Both Bates v. State Bar of Arizona53 and In re R. M. J.54 
permitted regulations designed to prevent the use of deceptive advertising.55 The 
Court in In re R. M. J. also recognized that even non-deceptive advertising might be 
restricted if the restriction was narrowly designed to achieve a substantial state 
interest,56 thus meeting Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny.57 The Court, citing 
Ohralik v. Ohio Sate Bar Association,58 further noted that rules prohibiting in-person 
solicitation of clients by attorneys are, at least under some circumstances, 
permissible.59 The Court’s application of the foregoing principles to the commercial 
speech of attorneys led to the conclusion that blanket bans on price advertising by 
attorneys and rules preventing attorneys from using non-deceptive terminology to 
describe their fields of practice were impermissible.60 
Critical, also, to the Court’s resolution of the second issue presented in Zauderer 
was the distinction it drew between Ohio’s legislation and Supreme Court 
jurisprudence establishing that compulsion to speak may be a violation of the First 
Amendment61:  
[T]he interests at stake in this case are not of the same order as those 
discussed in Wooley, Tornillo, and Barnette. Ohio has not attempted to 
“prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein.” (internal citation omitted). The State has attempted only to 
 
 51.  Id. at 629. 
 52.  Id. at 638. 
 53.  433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
 54.  455 U.S. 191 (1982). 
 55.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, at 635–36 (1985).  
 56.  Id.  
 57.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (prong two 
of the Central Hudson test requires the governmental interest asserted to be substantial). 
 58.  Ohralik v. Ohio St. Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).  
 59.  Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638.  
 60.  Id. at 638. 
 61.  See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that, in some instances, compulsion to speak 
may be as violative of the First Amendment as prohibitions on speech); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 
U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that, in some instances, compulsion to speak may be as violative of the First 
Amendment as prohibitions on speech); West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) 
(holding that, in some instances, compulsion to speak may be as violative of the First Amendment as 
prohibitions on speech). 
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prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising, and its 
prescription has taken the form of a requirement that appellant include in 
his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information about the 
terms under which his services will be available. 62   
In its conclusion, the Court first noted the well-settled general approach to 
commercial speech that state and federal governments are free to prevent the 
dissemination of commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading, or that 
proposed an illegal transaction.63 Additionally, the Court stated that “in virtually all 
. . . commercial speech decisions to date, [it] has emphasized that because 
disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on advertiser’s interests than 
do flat prohibitions on speech, ‘[warnings] or [disclaimers] might be appropriately 
required . . . in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or 
deception.’”64 From these conclusions, the Zauderer Standard was born:  
[A]n advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure 
requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing the 
deception of consumers.65  
The Zauderer Standard, akin to rational-basis review,66 is a looser standard than 
Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny test.67 The standard by which consumer 
deception in advertising is evaluated is justifiably looser than Central Hudson’s 
intermediate scrutiny because one’s “constitutionally protected interest in not 
providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal.”68 The 
Court did, however, recognize that unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure 
requirements may offend the First Amendment.69 
 
 62.  Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (emphasis added).  
 63.  Id. at 638 (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations 
Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973)). 
 64.  Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (citing In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)) (emphasis added). 
 65.  Id.  
 66.  N.Y. St. Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir. 2009); CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n 
v. City of Berkeley, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“[C]ircuit courts have essentially characterized 
the Zauderer test as a rational basis or rational review test.”); see also Dayna B. Royal, The Skinny on the Federal 
Menu-Labeling Law & Why It Should Survive a First Amendment Challenge, 10 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 140, 
184 (2011) (“[The Zauderer Standard] has been variously described as a reasonable-relationship rule, a rational 
relationship test, and rational-basis review.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 67.  See supra Section II.A (discussing Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny test).  
 68.  Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.  
 69.  Id.  
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C.  The Zauderer Federal Circuit Split  
Unquestionably, two levels of First Amendment scrutiny have emerged in the 
context of commercial speech.70 While the application of Central Hudson has 
remained relatively unchallenged, the expansiveness of Zauderer’s rational-basis 
review has become hotly contested amongst the lower federal courts.71 Some circuits 
have taken Zauderer at its word and have applied the Zauderer Standard in the 
context of correcting consumer deception.72 The First Circuit and Second Circuit, 
on the other hand, have held that Zauderer is not limited to cases in which the 
government aims to prevent deception.73 In an opinion overruling years of 
precedence, the D.C. Circuit, which hears the lion’s share of challenges to federal 
regulatory action,74 held that Zauderer “seems inherently applicable beyond the 
problem of deception.”75 The Supreme Court has done little to delineate this issue, 
and federal circuits remain in a constitutional grey-zone as to the precise bounds of 
Zauderer’s rational-basis review.76  
The outgrowth of this confusion has culminated into a question that federal 
courts have answered quite divergently: 
Whether, under the First Amendment, judicial review of mandatory 
disclosure of “purely factual and uncontroversial” commercial information, 
compelled for reasons other than preventing deception, can properly 
proceed under Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, or whether such 
compelled disclosure is subject to review under Central Hudson Gas & Elec. 
v. PSC of New York.77 
To date, the Supreme Court has refused to definitively answer this question, and the 
result has been a divisive split among federal circuits.78   
 
 70.  See supra Sections II.A, II.B. 
 71.  See infra note 78.  
 72.  See WILEY REIN, supra note 2 (citing Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 640–41 (6th Cir. 
2010)). 
 73.  See WILEY REIN, supra note 2; see Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 310 n.8 (1st Cir. 
2005); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001).   
 74.  See WILEY REIN, supra note 2. 
 75.  Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“To the extent that other cases in 
this circuit may be read as holding to the contrary and limiting Zauderer to cases in which the government 
points to an interest in correcting deception, we now overrule them.”). 
 76.  See infra note 78 and accompanying text.  
 77.  Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 2014 WL 2619836, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 4, 2014) (granting cert.) (question 
presented on review). 
 78.  Compare Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010) (applying 
Zauderer because the Government’s regulation imposing a disclosure requirement were “directed at misleading 
commercial speech”) (emphasis in original); Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 640–41 (6th Cir. 
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III.  SUPREME COURT GUIDANCE: A PROPER PARSING OF ZAUDERER 
The heavily fractured and extremely inconsistent application of the Zauderer 
Standard in the lower federal courts demands Supreme Court review.79 In doing so, 
the Court must decide whether Zauderer’s rational-basis review requires a showing 
that disclosure mandates aim to correct deceptive speech, or whether Zauderer’s 
relaxed standard can be counted on to protect disclosure obligations determined by 
the government to promote various interests, ranging from public and 
environmental health to economic development, social issues, and foreign policy.80  
The following subsections will argue that purely factual and uncontroversial 
disclosures are permissible if they are reasonably related to the State’s interest in 
addressing communication that is either false or deceptive, provided that the 
requirements are not unjustified or unduly burdensome. Subsection A will argue 
that Zauderer should be confined to cases of consumer deception. Subsection B will 
then explain that information subject to government-mandated disclosures 
designed to cure consumer deception must be both “purely factual” and 
“uncontroversial” in order to satisfy Zauderer’s legal test. 
A.  When to Apply Zauderer: Consumer Deception 
The Supreme Court has never extended Zauderer to disclosure requirements other 
than those correcting misleading commercial speech,81 and this should not come as 
a surprise. Justice Byron White, writing for the majority in Zauderer, expressed the 
 
2010) (holding that “Zauderer applies where a disclosure requirement targets speech as inherently misleading”); 
United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840, 849 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that the Zauderer Court “presumes that the 
government’s interest in preventing consumer deception is substantial”); Borgner v. Brooks, 284 F.3d 1204, 
1214 (11th Cir. 2002) (upholding required disclaimers on dental advertisements to correct consumer 
misconception); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 651 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that video 
game labels were subject to strict scrutiny because they were not purely factual and uncontroversial); Pub. 
Citizen, Inc. v. La. Att’y Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212, 228 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that required attorney 
advertising disclosures were reasonably related to the state’s interest in preventing deception); Ficker v. Curran, 
119 F.3d 1150, 1152 (4th Cir. 1997) (striking down state ban on an attorney’s targeted mailings because 
restriction failed intermediate scrutiny review); United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474, 484 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(upholding court order requiring fraudulent tax advice site to post injunction prominently on website to 
prevent consumer deception under Zauderer), with Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 297–98, 
310, 316 (1st Cir. 2005); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming use of the 
“reasonable-relationship Zauderer standard when the compelled disclosure at issue . . . was not intended to 
prevent ‘consumer confusion or deception’ ”); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 
556 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that “Zauderer’ s framework can apply even if the required disclosure’s purpose is 
something other than or in addition to preventing consumer deception”). 
 79.  See supra Section II.C.  
 80.  See WILEY REIN, supra note 2. 
 81.  Bianca Nunes, The Future of Government-Mandated Health Warnings After R.J. Reynolds and 
American Meat Institute, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 177, 185 (2014) (citing R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 
760 F.3d 1205, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).  
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Court’s holding with his customary precision: “We hold that an advertiser’s rights 
are adequately protected as long as the disclosure requirements are reasonably 
related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”82   
In qualifying the application of its intermediate scrutiny test, the Court in 
Central Hudson provided guidance as to the way courts should delineate the 
contrasting standards of Zauderer and Central Hudson: “If the communication is 
neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the government’s power is more 
circumscribed.”83 This language suggests that the government’s power is less 
circumscribed when commercial speech involves communication that is either 
misleading or related to unlawful activity. Zauderer’s rational-basis review is 
completely consistent with the foothold intentionally carved out by Central Hudson 
for deceptive commercial speech.84  
In an effort to contrast its rational-basis scrutiny from Central Hudson’s 
intermediate scrutiny, the Court first highlighted those circumstances governed by 
Central Hudson: 
Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does not concern 
unlawful activities . . . may be restricted only in the service of a substantial 
governmental interest, and only through means that directly advance that 
interest.85 
Implicit in this interpretation of Central Hudson is a declaration that (1) Zauderer’s 
rational-basis review applies to communication that is false or deceptive and (2) 
Central Hudson applies to commercial speech that is not false or deceptive. Thus, 
under Zauderer, purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures are permissible if 
they are reasonably related to the State’s interest in addressing communication that 
is either false or deceptive, provided that the requirements are not unjustified or 
unduly burdensome.86 
B.  How to Apply Zauderer: A Legal Test  
The Supreme Court’s responsibility in clarifying Zauderer will also require a parsing 
of the way in which the standard is actually applied.87 The legal test articulated by 
Zauderer “requires the disclosures to be of ‘purely factual and uncontroversial 
 
 82.  Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)). 
 83.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). 
 84.  Supra text accompanying note 83.   
 85.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985).  
 86.  See id. at 651. 
 87.  See infra notes 96–97.  
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information’ about the good or service being offered.”88 In applying this test, the 
Court must evaluate the type of speech that can be compelled by determining when 
a disclosure ceases to provide “purely factual and uncontroversial information,” 
and instead requires the speaker to recite a government message.89 
In attempting to dissect the separate elements of this test, the D.C. Circuit has 
properly gleaned from Zauderer that “uncontroversial” must mean something other 
than “purely factual.”90 The D.C. Circuit, speaking directly to the issues that are 
inherent in an interpretation of Zauderer that a disclosure requirement is 
“uncontroversial” if it is “purely factual,” rightly pointed out that: 
[I]f the law were otherwise, there would be no end to the government’s 
ability to skew public debate by forcing companies to use the government’s 
preferred language. For instance, companies could be compelled to state that 
their products are not “environmentally sustainable” or “fair trade” if the 
government provided “factual” definitions of those slogans — even if the 
companies vehemently disagreed that their [products] were “unsustainable” 
or “unfair.” Appellants Supp. Br. 12.91 
Admittedly, however, that which differentiates “factual” and “uncontroversial” is 
very much up for debate.92 Perhaps the distinction is between fact and opinion, but 
that line is often blurred, and it is far from clear that all opinions are controversial.93 
 
 88.  Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (citing Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)). There is dissent amongst the federal circuits 
as to whether this language does, in fact, create a legal standard. See, e.g., Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. 
United States, 674 F.3d 509, 559 n.8 (6th Cir. 2012) (opinion for court by Stranch, J.) (“Plaintiffs’ argument 
that Zauderer applies only to ‘purely factual and noncontroversial’ disclosures is unpersuasive. This language 
appears in Zauderer once and the context does not suggest that the Court is describing the characteristics that a 
disclosure must possess for a court to apply Zauderer’s rational-basis rule. That language instead merely 
describes the disclosure the Court faced in that specific instance. This reading is buttressed by the fact that 
elsewhere in Zauderer refers to a commercial speaker disclosing ‘factual information’ and ‘accurate 
information.’”) (internal citations omitted). This disagreement amongst the federal circuits may explain why 
“few courts have considered the constitutionality of disclosure regulations that fail the ‘factual’ or 
‘uncontroversial’ prerequisites of Zauderer.” Mass. Ass’n of Private Career Sch. v. Healey, 159 F. Supp. 3d 173, 
206 (D. Mass. 2016).  
 89.  Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First 
Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 542 (2012). 
 90.  Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Hence, the statement in AMI [that 
‘uncontroversial’ must mean something different than ‘purely factual’] describing ‘controversial in the sense 
that [the compelled speech] communicates a message that is controversial for some reason other than [a] 
dispute about a simple factual accuracy. AMI, 760 F.3d at 27.”).  
 91.  Id. at 530. 
 92.  See, e.g., infra note 93.  
 93.  Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 528. In highlighting the difficulty in defining these two elements of 
Zauderer’s legal test, the D.C. Circuit posed the following quandaries: “Is Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity 
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Notwithstanding the difficulty inherent in parsing these two elements, the need for 
courts to treat “purely factual” and “uncontroversial” as two distinct elements of 
the Zauderer legal test is critical.94  
While Zauderer’s “factual” requirement is relatively straightforward,95 the 
“uncontroversial” prong of Zauderer’s legal test is not one that, on its face, provides 
courts with much clarity.96 As such, courts have understandably struggled in 
determining whether a mandated disclosure compels “uncontroversial” 
information.97  
Some scholars have convincingly argued that courts should determine whether a 
mandated disclosure is “uncontroversial” by looking to the government’s purpose 
behind the regulation.98 In this sense, the government no longer compels factual and 
uncontroversial information when the mandated disclosure moves beyond 
compelled speech that provides factual, descriptive information about a product to 
compelled speech that urges the audience to take a certain course of action.99 This 
kind of disclosure law does not seek to change behavior through information, but 
rather to change behavior by spreading the government’s message that a certain 
product should or should not be used.100 In order to determine whether rational-
basis scrutiny applies to disclosure laws, courts should evaluate the government’s 
purpose in mandating the disclosure: if the government’s actual purpose is not to 
inform consumers, but rather to spread the government’s normative message, then 
the disclosure falls outside of Zauderer.101 Speech that expresses the government’s 
beliefs about how an individual should behave is known as “normative speech.”102  
 
fact or opinion, and should it be regarded as controversial? If the government required labels on all internal 
combustion engines stating that “USE OF THIS PRODUCT CONTRIBUTES TO GLOBAL WARMING” would 
that be fact or opinion? It is easy to convert many statements of opinion into assertions of fact simply by 
removing the words “in my opinion” or removing “in the opinion of many scientists” or removing “in the 
opinion of many experts.” Id.  
 94.  See infra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing the problems inherent in an interpretation of 
Zauderer that “purely factual” necessarily implies “uncontroversial”). 
 95.  See, e.g., infra Section V.B (recognizing as factual the information the FDA required food labels to 
include because it is supported by scientific data).  
 96.  See infra note 97.  
 97.  Compare Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“We also do not 
understand country-of-origin labeling to be controversial in the sense that it communicates a message that is 
controversial for some reason other than dispute about simple factual accuracy.”), with Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. 
SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“That the en banc court viewed the country-of-origin disclosures in 
AMI as ‘uncontroversial’ poses another puzzle. A controversy, the dictionary tells us, is a dispute, especially a 
public one. Was there a dispute about the county-of-origin disclosures in AMI or as AMI put it, was there a 
controversy ‘for some reason other than [a] dispute about simple factual accuracy’?”).  
 98.  See, e.g., Keighley, supra note 89, at 569–74. 
 99.  Id. at 569. 
 100.  Id. at 573. 
 101.  Id. at 574. 
 102.  Id. at 569.  
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Recognizing the difficulty in evaluating whether a disclosure mandates 
normative speech, courts should look to the government’s actual purpose in 
mandating the disclosure when determining whether Zauderer’s rational-basis 
scrutiny is warranted.103 Arguments in favor of this analysis submit that a “purpose 
inquiry” is the most reliable way of ensuring that the state does not use commercial 
disclosure laws to spread normative messages that are disguised as factual speech.104 
This approach provides an effective means to ferret out improper governmental 
motives and, in doing so, will shelter private corporations from regulatory 
mandates forcing them to disseminate the government’s messages.105  It should be 
noted that, in such circumstances, the government remains free to influence 
consumer behavior with its own speech – such as through advertising campaigns 
and consumer education.106 
A proper interpretation of Zauderer demands that the Court limit its application 
to cases involving consumer deception.107 Furthermore, when applied to cases of 
consumer deception, the Court should find that information-forcing disclosures 
necessarily fail Zauderer’s legal test if they do not compel information that is both 
“purely factual” and “uncontroversial.”108  
IV.  PERCEIVED PROBLEMS WITH A NARROW INTERPRETATION OF 
ZAUDERER: THE “CONSUMER RIGHT TO KNOW” 
Many advocates of labeling and disclosure requirements assert that consumers have 
a “right to know” about various product or process characteristics.109 Arguments 
that government regulations should require the disclosure of particular information 
about products or services rest on the premise that such information will not be 
disclosed—or will not be disclosed sufficiently—absent such a government 
 
 103.  Keighley, supra note 89, at 574.   
 104.  Id.  
 105.  See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 272 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that an 
FDA regulation requiring graphic images on tobacco products did not fit within Zauderer because the graphic 
images “were neither designed to protect the consumer from confusion or deception, nor to increase consumer 
awareness of smoking risks; rather, they were crafted to evoke a strong emotional response calculated to 
provoke the viewer to quit or never start smoking”), aff’d, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 
1216–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (concluding that the Final Rule’s “inflammatory images and the provocatively-named 
hotline cannot rationally be viewed as pure attempts to convey information to consumers”), abrogated on other 
grounds, Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 106.  Jonathan H. Adler, D.C. Circuit Finds SEC’s Conflict Mineral Disclosure Rule Violates First Amendment, 
WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/04/15/d-c-circuit-finds-secs-conflict-mineral-disclosure-rule-violates-first-amendment/ 
?utm_term=.a047e7366ad1. 
 107.  See supra Section III.A. 
 108.  See supra III.B.  
 109.  Jonathan H. Adler, There is No Consumer “Right to Know,” 39 CATO REG., no. 3, Fall 2016, at 26, 30. 
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requirement.110 First Amendment scholar Jonathan H. Adler has aptly summarized 
the current regulatory backdrop and corresponding legal challenges: 
 Governments at all levels frequently require the disclosure of potentially 
relevant information about goods or services offered for sale. Many 
disclosure requirements protect consumers from harms of which they are 
unaware and are relatively uncontroversial. In recent years, however, 
governments have imposed broader disclosure requirements extending 
beyond product characteristics to production processes, product history, and 
even information about the producer or service provider. Such disclosure 
requirements, often predicated on an alleged “consumer right to know,” 
have prompted legal challenges. In just the last two years, courts have 
struggled with constitutional challenges to mandatory country-of-origin 
labels, mandatory genetically modified organism (“GMO”) content labels, 
conflict mineral disclosures, and labels about the purported health risks 
posed by cell phones. This has revealed confusion and uncertainty about the 
extent to which the First Amendment protects and limits compelled 
commercial speech.111 
This Section will highlight two pieces of legislation that are directly, or 
incidentally, aimed at satisfying the proclaimed consumer right to know: one at the 
state level and one at the federal level. Subsection A will discuss Vermont’s GMO 
“Right to Know” Act, and Subsection B will discuss the underpinnings of the U.S. 
Food & Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) supplemental revisions to nutrition 
labeling regulations. Both of these examples demonstrate the current regulatory 
reliance on Zauderer in promulgating legislation responsive to the alleged consumer 
right to know. As will be discussed in Section V, infra, however, neither of these 
 
 110.  Id. at 32.  
 111.  Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer “Right to Know,” 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 
421, 424 (2016) (citing Brian R. Roe et al., The Economics of Voluntary Versus Mandatory Labels, 6 ANN. REV. 
RESOURCE ECON. 407, 409 (2014) (“[P]roduct labeling is an increasingly popular tool of regulators.”; Robert 
Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 868 (2015) (noting that “the growing number of 
circuit court decisions . . . have used the specific doctrine of ‘compelled commercial speech’ doctrine to strike 
down mandatory commercial disclosures”); Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 746 F.3d 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2014), aff’d en 
banc 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (upholding mandatory country-of-origin labels for meat products as 
against First Amendment challenges); Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583 (D. Vt. 2015) 
(upholding mandatory genetically engineered content labels as against First Amendment challenge); Nat’l Ass’n 
of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that mandatory “conflict mineral” disclosures violate 
First Amendment rights of regulated firms), aff’d on reh’g, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015); CTIA-The Wireless 
Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 158 F. Supp. 3d 897 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2016) (holding that local ordinances requiring 
disclosure of alleged radio frequency risks posed by cellular telephones did not violate the First Amendment)).  
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regulations trigger Zauderer because neither of them are designed to cure issues of 
consumer deception.112  
A.  Vermont’s GMO “Right to Know” Act  
On May 8, 2014, the Vermont legislature passed the “Right to Know” Act (“Act 
120”) that permitted the Attorney General of Vermont to adopt requirements that 
labels required for food produced from genetic engineering (1) include a disclaimer 
that the FDA does not consider foods produced from genetic engineering to be 
materially different from other foods and (2) identify food produced entirely or in 
part from genetic engineering in a manner consistent with requirements in other 
jurisdictions for the labeling of food, including the labeling of food produced with 
genetic engineering.113 Plainly stated, the purpose of this bill was to establish a 
system to allow for informed decisions by consumers with respect to potential 
health effects of genetically modified foods by requiring labels on covered food 
products to state that they are either “produced with genetic engineering” or “may 
be produced with genetic engineering.”114 
In response to Act 120, the Grocery Manufacturers Association filed a complaint 
in federal district court in June 2014 and sought a preliminary injunction in 
September 2014.115 The state of Vermont countered that the legislation should be 
subject to, and readily satisfied, the Zauderer Standard.116 In support of its argument 
that Zauderer should apply, Vermont contended that “Act 120’s GE disclosure 
requirement compels only factual, non-controversial commercial information.”117 
Federal District Court Judge Christina Reiss accepted the state of Vermont’s 
argument that the Zauderer Standard should govern her analysis because she 
deemed the compelled speech to be commercial in nature and to involve purely 
factual and uncontroversial information, and found that Vermont had a state interest 
beyond merely satisfying consumer curiosity.118 In support of these findings, Judge 
Reiss reasoned that “[b]ecause Act 120’s GE disclosure requirement mandates the 
 
 112.  See supra Section III.A (establishing that Zauderer applies solely to governmental regulation intended 
to cure issues of consumer deception).  
 113.  Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 601 (D. Vt. 2015). Under the Final Rule, “partially” 
may be used to modify “produced with genetic engineering” only when a processed food contains less than 75% 
genetically engineered material by weight. “May be” may be used to modify “produced with genetic 
engineering” only when the food’s manufacturer does not know, after reasonable inquiry, whether the food is, 
or contains a component that is, produced with genetic engineering. Id. at 602–03. 
 114.  Scott K.G. Kozak, Vermont GMO Battle Continues in Second Circuit, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 9, 2015), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/vermont-gmo-battle-continues-second-circuit.  
 115.  Id.  
 116.  Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 31–52, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583 (D. Vt. 
2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1504 (2d Cir. Aug. 24, 2015), 2015 WL 5086077, at *19–40.  
 117.  Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 626 (emphasis added).  
 118.  Id. (emphasis added).  
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disclosure of only factual information—whether a food product contains GE 
ingredients—in conjunction with a purely commercial transaction, it does not 
require the disclosure of ‘controversial’ information.”119 Judge Reiss subsequently 
refused to enjoin the law in a ruling issued on April 27, 2015.120 
The Grocery Manufacturers Association shortly thereafter filed appeal an with 
the Second Circuit.121 The basis of the Grocery Manufacturers Association’s position 
on appeal, as was the case at the trial court level, was that Act 120 violated the First 
Amendment by imposing a burden on speech based upon the content of that 
speech.122 The Grocery Manufacturers Association submitted that the 
constitutionality of Act 120 should be subject to Central Hudson’s intermediate 
scrutiny, rather than the Zauderer’s rational-basis review, and that its GMO labeling 
mandate fails Central Hudson.123 
Opining in its appellate brief that the public debate surrounding genetic 
engineering did not trigger intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson, Vermont 
relied heavily on the D.C. Circuit’s en banc decision in American Meat Institute v. 
USDA.124 In doing so, Vermont likened the labels required by Act 120 that required 
the disclosure of “only factual and accurate information” to the country-of-origin 
label requirements in American Meat Institute.125 Specifically, Vermont suggested 
that the court in American Meat Institute applied Zauderer due to the fact that the 
content of the country-of-origin labels at issue were deemed uncontroversial 
because they compelled factual information.126 To further solidify its argument that 
the Zauderer Standard applied, Vermont noted that “[a]lthough the Supreme Court 
confirmed that Zauderer applied to disclosures that combat misleading 
advertisements, it did not limit Zauderer to that context.”127   
Congress ultimately settled this matter before the Grocery Manufacturers 
Association’s appeal was heard by the Second Circuit. On July 14, 2016, the U.S. 
House of Representatives voted to approve H.R. 1599, The Safe and Accurate Food 
 
 119.  Id. at 630. 
 120.  See Kozak, supra note 114.  
 121.  Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 14, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583 (D. Vt. 2015), 
appeal docketed, No. 15-1504 (2d Cir. June 24, 2015), 2015 WL 3940689, at *1. 
 122.  Id. at 38, at *25; see Kozak, supra note 114.  
 123.  Id. at 47–59, at *34–46.  
 124.  Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 32–36, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583 (D. Vt. 
2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1504 (2d Cir. Aug. 24, 2015), 2015 WL 5086077, at *20–24.  
 125.  Id. at 35–36, at *24–25. 
 126.  Id. at 35, at *23 (citing Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (applying 
Zauderer because the court deemed the content of the message to be uncontroversial and because the court did 
parties did “not disagree with the truth of the facts required to be disclosed”).   
 127.  Id. at 43, at *31 (citing Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (noting 
that Milavetz P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010) “focused on remedying misleading advertisements,” 
but holding that Zauderer “sweeps far more broadly than the interest in remedying deception”)).  
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Labeling Act of 2015, to preempt Vermont’s mandatory GMO food labeling law.128 
This bill, commonly referred to as the “Deny American’s Right to Know” Act 
(“DARK Act”) by anti-GMO activists, was shortly thereafter signed into law by 
President Obama.129 
Though litigation concerning the constitutionality of Vermont’s GMO “Right to 
Know” Act has since become moot,130 the issue as to whether advocates of 
information-forcing regulations can rely on the Zauderer framework still very much 
remains.131 
B.  FDA’s Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Label  
In the same way that Vermont channeled Zauderer in support of its GMO “Right to 
Know” Act, federal regulatory agencies have latched on to Zauderer as the rubber 
stamp of approval by which to promulgate information-forcing regulations.132 On 
May 20, 2016, the FDA announced its “Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement 
Facts Label” for packaged food to reflect new scientific information, including the 
link between diet and chronic diseases such as obesity and heart disease.133 The FDA 
asserted that the new label would make it easier for consumers to make better-
informed food choices and to maintain healthy dietary practices.134 The 
requirements of this rule were designed to ensure that nutrient declarations on food 
labels were accurate, truthful, and not misleading based on information known only 
to the manufacturer.135 The FDA further asserted that the final rule would help with 
the efficient enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.136  
 
 128.  Thomas P. Redick & Jhoset A. Burgos-Rodriguez, Vermont’s GMO Labeling Law Meets Congress and 
the World Trade Organization, 20 A.B.A. AGRIC. MGMT. COMM. NEWSL., no. 1, Nov. 2016, at 14, 14.  
 129.  Christian Detisch, President Obama Signs DARK Act into Law, FOOD & WATER WATCH (Aug. 1, 2016), 
http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/news/president-obama-signs-dark-act-law. The DARK Act places the 
National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard in The Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 and establishes a 
national mandatory “GM” food disclosure standard. Redick & Burgos-Rodriguez, supra note 114, at 15. “As 
directed by the DARK Act, states will no longer have the right to mandate labeling of GE foods.” Id. at 16.  
 130.  See supra text accompanying notes 128–29.  
 131.  See infra Section V (negatively answering that question and explaining that Central Hudson governs 
regulations intended to appease the consumer “right to know”).  
 132.  I refer to Zauderer as a “rubber stamp of regulatory approval” because of the ways in which courts and 
regulatory agencies have contorted the standard to one that rarely, if ever, serves as a check on the government; 
the government almost always wins.  
 133.  Changes to the Nutrition Facts Label, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,  http://www.fda.gov/Food/ 
GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/LabelingNutrition/ucm385663.htm (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
 134.  Id.; Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Label, 81 Fed. Reg. 33,741, at 
33,744 (2016) (to be codified at 21 CFR pt. 101). 
 135.  Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Label, 81 Fed. Reg. at 33,746. 
 136.  Id. at 33,745. Section 403(q) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the FD&C Act) (21 U.S.C. 
343(q)) specifies certain nutrients to be declared in nutrition labeling, and authorizes the Secretary of Health 
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The FDA’s final rule was published in the Federal Register on May 27, 2016.137 
Comments submitted to the FDA’s proposed rule, accompanied by the FDA’s 
corresponding responses, were also published alongside the final rule.138 In support 
its revisions to food labeling requirements, the FDA relied heavily on the D.C. 
Circuit’s expansion of Zauderer in American Meat Institute to information-forcing 
regulations not intended to cure issues of consumer deception: 
 (Comment 21) Some comments said the added sugars declaration is not 
subject to the test in Zauderer, or, even if subject, does not meet such test. . . 
. 
 (Response) . . . Under Zauderer, the government can require disclosure 
of factual information in the realm of commercial speech as long as the 
disclosure provides accurate, factual information; is not unjustified or 
unduly burdensome; and “reasonably relate[s]” to a government interest.  
 . . . . 
 Some comments asserted that Zauderer is limited to cases where the 
government interest is in preventing consumer deception. Case law 
interpreting Zauderer clarifies that the government need not establish that 
compelled disclosure will prevent consumer deception for 
the Zauderer standard to apply. In American Meat Institute, the court 
held that “[t]he language with which Zauderer justified its approach . . . 
sweeps far more broadly than the interest in remedying deception. 760 F.3d 
18, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).”139 
The FDA’s reliance on Zauderer in promulgating information-forcing disclosures 
such as this nutrition labeling law demonstrates the significant role currently served 
by Zauderer in the current regulatory framework. 
As will be discussed at length in the following section, there is great concern that 
a ruling by the Supreme Court cabining Zauderer to exclusively issues of consumer 
deception would pull the lynchpin on regulations like the FDA’s nutrition labeling 
law because these types of regulations would therefore be subject to Central 
Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny. This notion is very much a misnomer and the 
 
and Human Services to require other nutrients to be declared if the Secretary determines that a nutrient will 
provide information regarding the nutritional value of such food that will assist consumers in maintaining 
healthy dietary practices. Id. at 33,744. 
 137.  See Changes to the Nutrition Facts Label, supra note 133. 
 138.  Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Label, 81 Fed. Reg. 33,741 passim. The 
FDA was required to allow time for comments to be submitted by the public in response to the proposed rule. 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (“[T]he agency shall give interested persons an 
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments. . . .”).  
 139.  Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Label, 81 Fed. Reg. at 33,758–60.  
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FDA’s nutrition labeling regulation, along with many others regulations similarly 
promulgated by federal agencies, is not necessarily doomed under Central Hudson’s 
framework. 
V.  REGULATORY AND CONSUMER “RIGHT TO KNOW” CONCERNS 
PROMPTED BY A NARROW INTERPRETATION OF ZAUDERER ARE 
UNFOUNDED 
Most existing labeling and disclosure requirements imposed under federal law are 
justified by a substantial state interest, such as the protection of unwitting 
consumers or the facilitation of a non-speech-related regulatory program.140 This 
Comment is not designed to refute the legitimacy of all information-forcing 
disclosures. As will be discussed in subsection B, information-forcing disclosure 
mandates that are designed to address a legitimate, scientifically backed, public 
health or safety risks satisfy the “substantial” government interest required by 
Central Hudson.141 This Comment fully intends, however, to demonstrate that 
regulations premised upon bald assertions of public health or safety risks—which 
find no scientific evidentiary support—merely demonstrate an effort to appease the 
consumer “right to know.” Regulatory efforts of this sort merely reflect an attempt 
by the federal government, as well as state legislatures, to enlist private corporations 
as mouthpieces for its own views and policy initiatives. These types of regulations 
necessarily fail Central Hudson, and private corporations are therefore protected 
under the bulwark of the First Amendment’s commercial speech doctrine.  
The premise of the Fist Amendment is that American consumers are neither 
sheep nor fools, and hence fully capable of considering both the substance of the 
speech presented to them and its proximate and ultimate source.142 One can 
imagine, however, a scenario in which an uninformed consumer, or a “sheep,” may 
in certain circumstances need protection.143 Certainly, under such circumstances, 
the government should be able to offer some sort of protection to consumers.144 
Consumer protection, in the form of government-mandated disclosures about a 
specific product, is not, however, without its constraints: it must comport with the 
 
 140.  Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer “Right to Know,” supra note 111, at 458.  
 141.  See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (prong 
two of the Central Hudson test requires the governmental interest asserted to be substantial). 
 142.  McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 258–59 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  
 143.  For example, forcing candy makers to disclose the presence of peanuts protects those with allergies. 
Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer “Right to Know,” supra note 111, at 443. Product safety 
labels can protect those who might be unaware of the danger a specific product may pose. Id. In such cases, the 
failure to label can leave otherwise uninformed consumers exposed to risks. Id.  
 144.  Id. (“Protecting consumers from unwitting harm is a substantial interest comparable to the 
government’s interest in protecting consumers from fraud or deception.”). 
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First Amendment.145 In attempting to regulate within the constitutional strictures of 
the First Amendment, the discussion necessarily shifts full circle to the standard by 
which courts should utilize to assess the propriety of such regulations: Zauderer or 
Central Hudson.146 The fundamental question in making this assessment is whether 
the information sought by the mandatory disclosure is designed to cure consumer 
deception.147 
As has been discussed at length, Zauderer applies to government-mandated 
disclosures of purely factual and uncontroversial information that are designed to 
cure deceptive commercial speech.148 Information-forcing regulations designed to 
quell consumer curiosity—which, in turn, enlist private corporations as 
mouthpieces for governmental policy initiatives, as opposed to serving to protect 
the public from legitimate health or safety concerns—simply do not fall under this 
purview.149 Rather, such regulations implicate Central Hudson’s framework. 
Proponents of consumer curiosity driven disclosures, and those who are concerned 
that a narrow application of Zauderer would doom the American regulatory 
structure as we know it,150 need not run for the hills. Though Central Hudson’s 
framework does not provide legislatures with the regulatory rubber stamp of 
approval that is inherent with Zauderer, it does not create an absolute bar to 
regulations directed toward protecting consumers from unknown harm.151 
This Section will compare the application of Central Hudson to information-
forcing regulations that are founded upon consumer curiosity, such as Vermont’s 
Act 120, with regulations, such as the FDA’s “Revision of the Nutrition and 
Supplement Facts Label,” in which there exists scientific evidence supporting the 
 
 145.  See supra Section II.   
 146.  See supra Sections II.A, II.B.  
 147.  See supra Section III.A (establishing that Zauderer applies exclusively to regulations designed to cure 
consumer deception, and that Central Hudson governs all other types of information-forcing regulations). 
 148.  See supra Section III.A (establishing that Zauderer applies solely to governmental regulation intended 
to cure issues of consumer deception). 
 149.  See supra Section III.A (establishing that Zauderer applies solely to governmental regulation intended 
to cure issues of consumer deception). 
 150.  See, e.g., Nunes, supra note 81, at 179–80 (“Given that the D.C. Circuit is responsible for reviewing 
many federal agency regulations, American Meat Institute marks a very significant victory for regulators. A 
contrary holding—one limiting the protection of Zauderer rational basis review to compelled speech aimed at 
curing consumer deception—would have threatened to unsettle the regulatory regime, and would have 
particularly threatened mandates aimed at promoting public health.”); Robert Post, Compelled Commercial 
Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 885 (2015) (arguing that an application of Central Hudson to information-
forcing regulations would “jeopardize the entire movement of American administrative law toward 
information-forcing strategies”).  
 151.  “Protecting compelled commercial speech as commercial speech under Central Hudson does not pose 
a threat to the free flow of information in the marketplace. To the contrary, constraining undue government in 
the marketplace ensures the broadest space for the discovery and disclosure of information that consumers are 
most worried about, while also ensuring that the government retains the ability to protect consumers from 
unscrupulous producers and sellers.” Adler, There is No Consumer “Right to Know,” supra note 109, at 33. 
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government’s asserted interest in protecting consumers from public health risks. 
This Section will demonstrate that regulations like Vermont’s Act 120 fail, rightfully 
so, Central Hudson.152 This Section will also alleviate regulatory and consumer 
concern by demonstrating that regulations designed to address to protect 
consumers from health or safety risks, which are supported by scientific evidence, 
satisfy the “substantial” government interest required by Central Hudson. 
Subsections A and B of this Comment will demonstrate why some information-
forcing disclosures likely fall short of satisfying Central Hudson, while others 
unquestionably pass muster. Subsection C will then highlight the ways in which the 
free market, absent governmental regulations, has and will continue to 
accommodate perceived voids in information available to consumers. 
A.  Regulations intended to appease consumer curiosity, absent scientific evidence of a 
legitimate public health or safety risk, likely fail Central Hudson. 
Consumer curiosity, alone, is not a strong enough state interest to sustain 
compulsion of even an accurate, factual statement in a commercial context.153 If 
consumer curiosity were alone sufficient to compel labeling, there would be no end 
to the information companies may be required to disclose.154 There is a general 
consensus surrounding this paradigm, even amongst those federal regulatory 
agencies that seek to apply the Zauderer Standard to such regulations.155 For 
example, even the FDA, which asserted that Zauderer governed its promulgation of 
the “Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Label,” conceded that the 
government could not rely exclusively on consumer curiosity in its attempt to 
require mandatory labeling.156 
Much of the discussion surrounding the consumer right to know involves 
consumer curiosity, rather than an absolute lack of consumer knowledge or an 
asserted health or safety risk that is alleged to be inherent in corporate silence.157 
Vermont’s GMO “Right to Know” Act 120 required the “clear and conspicuous” 
labeling of all food intended for human consumption “produced entirely or in part 
from genetic engineering.”158 The Vermont legislature reasoned that a mandatory 
 
 152.  See infra Section V.A (establishing that consumer curiosity, alone, fails to satisfy Central Hudson’s 
“substantial interest” requirement).  
 153.  Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996).  
 154.  Id.  
 155.  See, e.g., infra note 156.  
 156.  The FDA, in its response to comments submitted its proposed rule revising nutritional facts labeling, 
conceded that consumer interest. Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Label, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 33,741, at 33,813 (“[C]onsumer interest alone is not sufficient to require mandatory labeling.”). 
 157.  See, e.g., infra notes 158–60.  
 158.  Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer “Right to Know,” supra note 111, at 463 (citing 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9 § 3043 (2016)).   
Wettengel PP v3 (Do Not Delete) 4/7/2017  9:01 AM 
 Jeffrey S. Wettengel 
Vol. 12, No. 2 2017 347 
label would provide consumers with “information they can use to make decisions 
about what products they would prefer to purchase” and would “prevent 
inadvertent consumer deception, prevent potential risks to human health, protect 
religious practices, and the environment.”159 In support of this regulation, the 
Vermont legislature declared that such foods “potentially pose risks to health, 
safety, agriculture, and the environment,” citing an alleged “lack of consensus 
regarding the validity of the research and science surrounding the safety of 
genetically engineered foods.”160 These goals are irrefutably compelling. Under 
Central Hudson, however, the dispositive question is not whether the Vermont 
legislature’s regulation was well intended; rather, the question is whether the 
government’s interest in promulgating Act 120 was substantial.161 
By the Vermont legislature’s own admission, these consumers are not sheep, nor 
are they fools; the legislature simply sought to provide additional information in an 
attempt to best-educate consumers on their purchasing decisions.162 The question in 
assessing this regulation therefore becomes whether the government’s interest in 
compelling information to satisfy consumer curiosity or meet the demands of an 
alleged consumer right to know is substantial.163 Of course, it is not. Absent scientific 
support of a legitimate public health or safety concern, like that cited by the FDA in 
its revisions to nutrition labeling, regulations premised exclusively on satisfying the 
whimsical desires of the consumer fall short of satisfying Central Hudson’s 
intermediate scrutiny.164 
B.  Central Hudson’s “substantial interest” prong is met when the government can 
point to scientific evidence of a legitimate public health or safety concern. 
The FDA’s supplemental nutrition labeling legislation was enacted, at least in part, 
with the intention of satisfying the government’s interest in providing information 
 
 159.  Id. (citing Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 120 (codified as amended Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9 § 3041 (2016))). 
Vermont’s GMO “Right to Know” Act, for example, was designed with the intent to reduce consumer 
confusion and deception, improve public health and food safety, inform decisions regarding environmental 
impacts, and protect religious practices. Redick & Burgos-Rodriguez, supra note 128, at 15.  
 160.  Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer “Right to Know,” supra note 111, at 463.  
 161.  See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). There 
can be little question at the outset of this inquiry that such expressions satisfy the first prong of Central Hudson 
and are, in fact, protected by the First Amendment. Id. (for commercial speech to find protection under the 
First Amendment, “it must at least concern lawful activity and not be misleading”).  
 162.  See supra note 159 and accompanying text (citing Vermont’s desire to aid consumers in more 
effectively purchasing products that they preferred, rather than protect consumers from a known health or 
safety risk).  
 163.  See Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer “Right to Know,” supra note 111, at 453.  
 164.  See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (prong 
two of the Central Hudson test requires the governmental interest asserted to be substantial). 
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needed to assist consumers in maintaining healthy dietary practices.165 In this sense, 
the FDA’s intentions weren’t dissimilar from those of the Vermont legislature in 
passing the GMO “Right to Know” Act.166 Unlike Vermont’s GMO “Right to Know” 
Act, however, the FDA’s nutrition labeling regulation is heavily backed by scientific 
support of a legitimate public health concern.167 This distinction is constitutionally 
significant, as the primary argument against a generic “contains GMOs” label is that 
the government lacks a substantial interest in compelling disclosures absent 
scientific evidence of a causal connection between the consumption of GMOs and 
an asserted risk to public health.168 If the government is unable to point to a 
substantial interest in compelling information-forcing disclosures, the regulation 
necessarily fails Central Hudson.169 
The asserted interest in the FDA’s revised nutrition labeling regulations was to 
address public health concerns that were brought to light by developments within 
the scientific community. In its preamble to the proposed rule, the FDA discussed 
in great detail the scientific foundation upon which it concluded that revisions to 
the nutrition labeling regulations were warranted: 
 Rates of chronic disease, such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and 
cancer, and changes in obesity rates; 
 
 Dietary recommendations, consensus reports, and national survey data, 
such as the Institute of Medicine (IOM) Dietary Reference Intakes Reports 
(which resulted in the development of a set of reference values known 
collectively as Dietary Reference Intakes (DRIs). . . . The DGA is developed 
jointly by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services and provides key recommendations on dietary 
patterns and quantitative intake recommendations with respect to 
micronutrients and macronutrients. Although the preamble to the proposed 
rule discussed the DGA that was issued in 2010, in February 2015, the 
Scientific Report of the 2015 Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee 
(DGAC Report) became publicly available. While the DGAC Report is not 
a DGA itself (because the Federal government must determine how to use 
 
 165.  Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Label, 81 Fed. Reg. 33,741, at 33,759. 
 166.  See supra Section IV.A (discussing the Vermont legislature’s intention to educate consumers in 
decisions).  
 167.  Cf. supra Section V.A. (noting a lack of consensus regarding the validity of the research and science 
surrounding the safety of genetically engineered foods). 
 168.  Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer “Right to Know,” supra note 111, at 464.  
 169.  See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (prong 
two of the Central Hudson test requires the governmental interest asserted to be substantial); supra Section III.A 
(establishing that Central Hudson applies to disclosure mandates not intended to cure issues of consumer 
deception).  
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the information in the DGAC Report to develop the 2015-2020 version of 
the DGA), the DGAC Report contains scientific information on specific 
nutrients and vitamins as well as a review of the underlying scientific 
evidence.  
 . . . . 
 The 2015 DGAC report further contributed to the scientific support for 
the added sugars declaration. For the first time, the 2015 DGAC conducted 
a systematic review of the relationship between dietary patterns and health 
outcomes. The DGAC found a strong association of a dietary pattern 
characterized, in part, by lower consumption of sugar-sweetened foods and 
beverages relative to a less healthy dietary pattern and reduced risk of CVD. 
We reviewed and considered the evidence that the 2015 DGAC relied upon, 
including an existing review from the Nutrition Evidence Library (NEL) 
Dietary Patterns Systematic Review Project as well as the NHLBI Lifestyle 
Interventions to Reduce Cardiovascular Risk: Systematic Evidence Review 
from the Lifestyle Work Group (“NHLBI Lifestyle Evidence Review”) and 
the associated American Heart Association (AHA)/American College of 
Cardiology (ACC) Guideline on Lifestyle Management to Reduce 
Cardiovascular Risk (“Lifestyle Management Report”).170 
Where there is scientific evidence that inadequacies in current nutrition labels 
pose a risk to public health or safety, it should be relatively easy to impose a product 
or material-specific labeling requirement without raising First Amendment 
problems.171 Scientific evidence, such as that cited by the FDA, is significant because 
it demonstrates a legitimate public health or safety risk.172 In the case of Vermont’s 
GMO “Right to Know” Act, the legislature’s bald, unsubstantiated claim of public 
health risks merely masked its intention to satisfy consumer curiosity; an interest 
that is not substantial and, therefore, fails Central Hudson.173 When the government 
is able to substantiate its cited interest in protecting the public from health or safety 
concerns, Central Hudson is almost undoubtedly satisfied.174  
 
 170.  Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Label, 81 Fed. Reg. at 33,747, 33,759 
(internal citations omitted).  
 171.  Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer “Right to Know,” supra note 111, at 465. 
 172.  See id. at 464 (“As the Second Circuit concluded in Amestoy, it is hard to justify such a label without a 
public-health or safety justification.”). See also id. at 464 n.226 (citing Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 
104, 115 n.6 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting the Amestoy decision “was expressly limited to cases in which a state 
disclosure requirement is supported by no interest other than the gratification of ‘consumer curiosity.’”)).  
 173.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (prong two 
of the Central Hudson test requires the governmental interest asserted to be substantial). 
 174.  Id. Cf. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Absent, however, some 
indication that this information bears on a reasonable concern for human health or safety or some other 
sufficiently substantial governmental concern, the manufacturers cannot be compelled to disclose it.”). 
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C.  The free market can effectively account for consumer curiosity even in the absence of 
information-forcing disclosure mandates.   
In the absence of a substantial interest, regulations compelling corporate disclosures 
necessarily fail Central Hudson.175 Accordingly, the government should be precluded 
from dictating corporate discourse in these areas. A constitutional bar on these 
types of information-forcing regulations does not, however, leave consumers in the 
dark.176 To the contrary, the absence of governmental regulations presents an 
opportunity for corporations to gain a competitive edge in the market by 
responding to perceived gaps in information sought by consumers.  
In competitive markets, the failure to disclose information desired by consumers 
can be costly.177 Notwithstanding the inherent skepticism regulators may harbor 
towards free markets, there has already been a shift in the way markets are 
responding to the consumer movement towards increased product disclosures even 
in the absence of governmental regulations. Take, for example, the Non-GMO 
Project.178 The Non-GMO Project is a nonprofit organization committed to 
preserving and building sources of non-GMO products, educating consumers and 
providing verified non-GMO choices.179 The Non-GMO Project was created in 2007 
by two grocery stores: the Natural Grocery Company in Berkeley, California and the 
Big Carrot Natural Food Market in Toronto, Ontario.180 The Non-GMO Project 
believes that “everyone has a right to know what is in their food and deserves access 
to non-GMO choices.181 Also among the Non-GMO Project’s asserted beliefs is the 
insistence that “by voting with [consumer] dollars every time we shop, collectively 
[consumers] have the power to change the way our food is grown and made.”182 To 
give the Project the rigorous scientific foundation and world-class technical support 
 
 175.  See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (prong 
two of the Central Hudson test requires the governmental interest asserted to be substantial). 
 176.  Cf. Scott Faber, Pompeo’s DARK Act Will Keep Consumers in the Dark, JUST LABEL IT!, 
http://www.justlabelit.org/pompeos-dark-act-will-keep-consumers-in-the-dark/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2017) 
(“Rep. Mike Pompeo (R-Kans.) has introduced the Deny Americans the Right to Know (DARK) Act to keep 
consumers, well, in the dark about whether or not their food contains GE ingredients.”). 
 177.  Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer “Right to Know,” supra note 111, at 453. 
 178.   NON GMO PROJECT, https://www.nongmoproject.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).  
 179.  Mission, NON GMO PROJECT, http://www.nongmoproject.org/about/mission (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).  
 180.  History, NON GMO PROJECT, http://www.nongmoproject.org/about/mission (last visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
The Natural Grocery Company had rallied 161 stores in a letter-writing campaign asking manufacturers about 
the GMO status of their products. The Big Carrot Natural Food Market developed its own non-GMO 
purchasing policy after more than a year of research. They combined their efforts into the Non-GMO Project 
with the goal of creating a standardized definition for non-GMO products in the North American food 
industry. Id.  
 181.  Mission, NON GMO PROJECT, http://www.nongmoproject.org/about/mission (last visited February 7, 
2016). 
 182.  Id. 
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necessary for their endeavor, the organization began working with the Global ID 
Group,183 the world leaders in non-GMO testing, certification, and consulting.184 
The first products to bear the Non-GMO Project’s standard butterfly label 
reached the marketplace in early 2010.185 The Non-GMO Project’s Product 
Verification Program has grown steadily since then, with more than 3,000 verified 
brands, representing nearly 43,000 products and more than $19.2 billion in sales.186 
As a result of consumer demand across North America, Non-GMO Project Verified 
products remain one of the fastest growing sectors in the marketplace and the 
Project’s butterfly is one of the most trusted labels for GMO avoidance among 
shoppers today.187 
In the case of GMO’s, the free market is already experiencing an “arms race” to 
provide consumers with the information they are seeking.188 In areas not yet affected 
by this race to disclose, the government is not facially precluded from mandating 
disclosures designed to remedy consumer curiosity so long as there is a substantial 
government interest.189 Central Hudson’s framework remains a viable avenue by 
which the government can mandate corporate disclosures of this type.190 While the 
added hurdles of Central Hudson do not provide a rubber stamp for all 
information-forcing regulations, ample means by which to regulate within the 
confines of the First Amendment remain.191 Furthermore, even in the absence of 
such regulations, there are market forces that nonetheless lure corporations to 
disclose information that consumers, who speak collectively vis-à-vis their 
pocketbooks, seek.  
 
 183.  “Global ID Group companies provide integrated food safety and food quality solutions that address 
the challenges and opportunities in the rapidly evolving food industry. Serving more than 15,000 clients in over 
100 countries with a market-leading portfolio of testing, inspection, certification and consulting services, the 
Global Id Group helps companies navigate an increasingly regulated global food economy demanding higher 
levels of transparency, accountability, safety and sustainability.” GLOBAL-ID GROUP, https://www.global-id-
group.com/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).  
 184.  History, NON GMO PROJECT, http://www.nongmoproject.org/about/mission (last visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
 185.  Id.  
 186.  Id.  
 187.  Id.  
 188.  Consumers generally assume that firms highlight the positive attributes of their products. Adler, 
Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer “Right to Know,” supra note 111, at 453. As a result, the failure 
to disclose positive information creates a negative inference, particularly when competitors highlight the 
attribute in question. Id. (internal citation omitted). This often creates a dynamic known as “unfolding” or 
“competitive disclosure,” as firms face pressure to match the positive claims made by their competitors. Id. 
(citing Pauline M. Ippolito & Alan D. Mathios, The Regulation of Science-Based Claims in Advertising, 13 J. 
CONSUMER POL’Y 413, 427–28 (1990)). 
 189.  Supra text accompanying note 174. 
 190.  See supra Section V.B. 
 191.  See supra Section V.B (establishing that disclosure mandates designed to protect consumers from 
unwitting harm or health and safety risks readily satisfy Central Hudson’s “substantial interest” requirement).  
WETTENGEL PP v3 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/7/2017  9:01 AM 
 Reconciling the Consumer Right to Know 
352 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
VI.  WRITING ON THE WALL: PRIVATE SECTOR MOUTHPIECE FOR A 
PUBLIC SECTOR POLICY INITIATIVE 
The introduction of this Comment posited that requiring a company to publicly 
condemn itself is undoubtedly a more effective way for the government to 
stigmatize behavior than for the government to convey a certain view itself.192 
Though initially posed as theoretical, an expansive interpretation of Zauderer—one 
extending its application beyond issues of consumer deception—would provide the 
government with the means by which to actually use corporations as its mouthpiece 
for its views and policy initiatives through mandated disclosures of factual 
information.193 Corporate responsibility disclosures demonstrate exactly the type of 
policy warfare that the government could wage against publicly traded corporations 
through the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 
In July 2011, the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (“SASB”) was 
incorporated for the purpose of establishing industry-based sustainability standards 
for the recognition and disclosure of material environmental, social, and 
governance impacts by companies traded on U.S. exchanges.194 SASB standards are 
designed for disclosure in mandatory filings to the SEC, such as the Form 10-K and 
20-F.195 SASB offers disclosure guidance on material sustainability issues for the 
benefit of investors and the public.196 Sustainability, according to SASB, refers to 
environmental, social, and governance dimensions of a company’s operation and 
performance.197 SASB’s mission is to, over time, provide the reasonable investor 
with accounting for a corporation’s sustainability performance by providing better 
access to the “total mix” of information that would be useful to financial 
valuation.198  
Currently, sustainability standards identified by SASB are not required to be 
included in SEC filings.199 SASB simply identifies sustainability topics in different 
 
 192.  Reply Brief of Appellants, supra, note 1. 
 193.  See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 210–11.  
 194.  About SASB, SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, www.sasb.org/sasb (last visited Jan. 27, 
2016). SASB is an independent 501(c)(3) non-profit organization and it accredited to set standards by the 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI). Conceptual Framework of the Sustainability Accounting 
Standards Board, SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD (Oct. 2013), at 3, http://www.sasb.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/SASB-Conceptual-Framework-Final-Formatted-10-22-13.pdf. 
 195.  Id.  
 196.  Id. “Ultimately, the goal of sustainability accounting and disclosure is to inform development of an 
integrated business strategy for corporate management and assess sustainability risks and opportunities 
inherent to investment decisions.” Id.  
 197.  Id. at 7.  
 198.  Id. at 4.  
 199.  Id. at 19–20.  
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industries that may by material to certain companies within that industry.200 In 
identifying topics that may be material, SASB analysis is guided by the Supreme 
Court’s definition of “material”: information is material if there is a “substantial 
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the 
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of the information 
made available.”201 Bearing in mind that publicly traded corporations are required 
to disclose all material information in their filings with the SEC,202 the sustainability 
standards identified by SASB are merely guidance—or suggestions—as to 
information that may be considered as material in certain industries.203 Ultimately, 
however, the burden to identify and disclose material information in a Form 10-K, 
20-F, or other SEC filing falls exclusively on the company.204  
Again, it is worth emphasizing that SASB’s sustainability standards currently 
serve merely as guidance for public corporations when filing material information 
with the SEC.205 According to SASB, “sustainability issues are of interest to an 
investor because mega-trends like climate change, resource constraints, population 
growth, and civil unrest affect the ability of corporations to sustain creation of 
financial value.”206 At its core, SASB sustainability standards attempt to factor non-
economic issues into an economic valuation of publicly traded corporations by 
asking corporations to disclose factual information that would not generally appear 
in a corporation’s SEC filings.207 What if, however, SASB—or another federal 
governmental agency, like the SEC—had the authority to actually mandate the 
disclosure of this non-economic information? In Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., the D.C. 
Circuit echoed this exact concern and provided a prophetic response: 
 
 200.  Conceptual Framework of the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BOARD (Oct. 2013), at 19, http://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/SASB-Conceptual-
Framework-Final-Formatted-10-22-13.pdf. 
 201.  TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).  
 202.  Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11(a), 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l (2012).  
 203.  Conceptual Framework of the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BOARD (Oct. 2013), at 19, http://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/SASB-Conceptual-
Framework-Final-Formatted-10-22-13.pdf.   
 204.  Id. at 19–20. According to case law and SEC guidance, corporate management should use a two-part 
assessment based on probability and magnitude when determining whether information should be disclosed: 
(1) a reasonable likelihood that the known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty will occur; and 
(2) a reasonable likelihood that the occurrence will have a material effect on the registrant’s financial condition 
or results of operation. Id. at 9.  
 205.  See supra text accompanying note 199.  
 206.  Conceptual Framework of the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BOARD (Oct. 2013), at 14, http://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/SASB-Conceptual-
Framework-Final-Formatted-10-22-13.pdf.   
 207.  Sustainability accounting and disclosure is intended as a complement to financial accounting, such 
that financial information and sustainability information can be evaluated side by side and provide a complete 
view of a corporation’s performance and value creation, both financial and non-financial, and across all forms 
of capital. Id. at 3. 
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[C]ompanies could be compelled to state that their products are not 
“environmentally sustainable” or “fair trade” if the government provided 
factual definitions of those slogans – even if the companies vehemently 
disagreed that their [products] were “unsustainable” or “unfair.”208  
While this concern may seem overly speculative, we need only look as far as the 
U.S. District Court’s decision in Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell and the subsequent 
appellate brief submitted by the state of Vermont209 to see that an expansion of 
Zauderer could have a real impact on the ability of the government to compel 
publicly traded corporations to disclose non-economic information about their 
business. If the U.S. District Court’s decision that factual information is inherently 
uncontroversial were to be accepted by the Supreme Court, the government would 
have the capability to mandate the disclosure of not only GMOs in food products, 
but also the type of non-economic information addressed in SASB’s sustainability 
standards.210 Because the government would have the power to mandate the 
disclosure of factual information, the SEC could adopt SASB’s sustainability 
standards as part of the filings it requires from publicly traded corporations.211 In 
this scenario, SASB could potentially evolve from providing guidance to serving as 
an administrator of disclosure mandates that companies in certain industries would 
be required to disclose to the SEC, and thus the public. In this scenario, publicly 
traded corporations would serve as a corporate mouthpiece for factual information 
that the government deemed relevant to its policies and interests. Thus, First 
Amendment protections from disclosure mandates would become virtually non-
existent.  
Applying Zauderer to mandate the disclosure of information in an attempt to 
regulate corporate responsibility is a far cry from curing issues of consumer 
deception.212 The application of Zauderer in this scenario, however, is not a far cry 
from the way that the American Meat Institute Court and subsequently lower courts 
have employed the standard to promulgate and approve disclosure mandates.213  
 
 208.  Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal citation omitted).  
 209.  See supra Section IV.A.  
 210.  See supra text accompanying notes 118–19; supra note 207 (discussing suggested disclosure of “non-
financial” information).  
 211.  While the sustainability disclosures are currently optional, an interpretation of Zauderer that “factual” 
necessarily implies “uncontroversial” would readily permit the SEC to mandate sustainability disclosures that 
were deemed “factual.” 
 212.  Compare supra Section III.A (establishing that Zauderer is confined to curing issues of consumer 
deception), with supra Section VI (posing the hypothetical or using Zauderer to compel the disclosure of 
information that is “factual” in an effort to further educate consumers in the securities market).  
 213.  See supra Sections II.C, IV.B.   
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CONCLUSION 
The expansion of Zauderer outside the scope of consumer deception renders private 
corporations defenseless against the self-interested motives of both consumers and 
the government. At the mercy of Zauderer’s rational-basis review, private 
corporations have found themselves subject to regulations mandating the disclosure 
of information serving to appease consumer curiosity and to enlist corporations as 
mouthpieces for governmental views and policy initiatives. The constitutional 
propriety of these regulations should be assessed under Central Hudson’s 
intermediate scrutiny—rather than Zauderer’s rational-basis review—because they 
are not responsive to perceived issues of consumer deception.  
Central Hudson appropriately counterbalances the corporate right to First 
Amendment protection against both the consumer right to know and the 
government’s interest in furthering its own views and policy initiatives. The 
Supreme Court can ensure adequate protection under the Constitution by cabining 
Zauderer to consumer deception and by asserting, with finality, that Central Hudson 
governs all other regulations.  
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